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Updated February 2010
Missile Overview
Introduction
In the early 1970s, Syria began accumulating the necessary technology and components to develop one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East. Syria's early attempts at achieving strategic parity with its principal adversary, Israel, eventually led it to develop a robust chemical weapons program that relies on ballistic missile delivery systems. By responding to the Israeli threat with an asymmetric build-up, Syria has avoided the unaffordable alternative of attempting to match Israel's sophisticated conventional warfighting capabilities. [1]
Damascus has consistently relied on foreign assistance to develop its missile program, initially obtaining the majority of its missile technology from the Soviet Union. By the mid-1970s, its changing relationship with the USSR forced Syria to begin diversifying its suppliers. [2] Turning to a variety of new suppliers, including China, North Korea, and Iran, Damascus made its missile program less dependent on the whims of any one country.
Determined to achieve an indigenous capability, Syria has improved its domestic missile procurement capabilities through foreign assistance. Syria is now capable of producing advanced Scud variants, but still cannot develop more sophisticated systems without foreign assistance.
Capabilities
Table 1 shows the basic design characteristics of Syria's ballistic missile arsenal, including missiles Syria has allegedly acquired from foreign sources. Nearly all of Syria's several hundred operational missiles utilize a liquid-fuel propulsion system and an inertial guidance system. [3] Additionally, each of Syria's Scud variants is likely designed to deliver chemical warheads and/or munitions. [4]
Table 1: Design Characteristics of Syria's Ballistic Missiles
| Missile | Length (m) | Diameter (m) | Warhead wt. (kg) | Range (km) | Accuracy –CEP (m) | Propellant | Status |
| Frog-7 [5] | 9.4 | .54 | 550 | 70 | 500-700 | Liquid | Operational |
| SS-21 Scarab [6] | 6.4 | .65 | 482 | 70-120 | 30-160 | Solid | Operational |
| Scud B [7] | 11.25 | .88 | 770-1,000 | 300 | 450 | Liquid | Operational |
| Scud C [8] | 11.25 | .88 | 500-800 | 500-700 | 50-900 | Liquid | Operational |
| Scud D [9] | 13.5 | .88 | 500-1000 | 700-1,500 | 50-190 | Liquid | Unknown |
| *M-9 [10] | 9.10 | 1.00 | 500-1,000 | 600-800 | 280-600 | Solid | Unknown |
| *M-11 [11] | 7.5 | .80 | 800-1,000 | 280 | 200 | Solid | Unknown |
| *Fateh A-110 [12] | 8.86 | .61 | 500 | 210 | 100 | Solid | Unknown |
| SS-N-3b (Sepal) [13] | 10.00 | .9 | 800-1,000 | 300-450 | Unknown | Solid | Operational |
| SS-N-2C (Styx) [14] | 6.49 | .78 | 450-520 | 50-80 | Unknown | Liquid | Operational |
*Syrian possession of these missiles is based on unconfirmed reports, and therefore these missiles' actual warhead weight and range cannot be stated with certainty.
In the 1970s, Syria did not possess any indigenous development capabilities. Syria's first two missile types, the SS-21 and the Scud B, were both acquired from the Soviet Union. The Scud C and D, which are now Syria's most advanced missile variants, were reportedly obtained from North Korea. Syria has also received assistance from China and Iran to produce the Scud C and D indigenously. Israeli defense officials have reportedly estimated that Syria may be manufacturing as many as 30 Scud Cs per year. [15]
Damascus's indigenous missile production capabilities continue to improve, reflected in the fact that it now produces the majority of its liquid-propelled missiles, and specifically all three Scud variants. However, Syria remains reliant on foreign assistance to acquire the technology, training and missile components needed for more advanced missile systems, particularly those that are solid-fueled. [16] Moreover, since Damascus has little experience with missile use outside of the testing environment, the performance of its missiles and the overall effectiveness of its arsenal remain unproven. [17]
History
Early Attempts to Achieve a Strategic Deterrent: 1970-1989
In the early 1970s, Syria began pursuing a
ballistic missile arsenal. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Syria's sole
missile was the Soviet-supplied FROG-7, whose range and accuracy proved
inadequate to strike desired targets. [18] Syria therefore requested Scud Bs
from the Soviet Union, receiving its first delivery of missiles and launchers
shortly after the war. Although outdated by modern standards, the Scud B
represented a significant upgrade from the FROG-7. Its 300km range and poor
accuracy, however, did not meet Syria's overall strategic needs, forcing
it to continue searching for upgrades.
Syria learned from both the 1967 and 1973 wars against Israel that its conventional forces were dramatically inferior to Israel's—yet Damascus could not realistically match Israeli conventional capabilities. President Hafez al-Assad therefore adopted a doctrine of "Strategic Parity," an asymmetric strategy based on chemical weapons deterrence. [19] Initially Syria planned to deliver its chemical weapons exclusively using aerial bombs, but these were impractical given its weak air force. Moreover, ballistic missiles could serve as a credible strategic deterrent while reducing the gap between Syria and Israel's military capabilities. Therefore as Damascus began to develop its chemical weapons program in the late 1970s, its missile program assumed a new importance.
In early 1983, Syria attempted to acquire a more advanced missile with improved accuracy and payload. Damascus negotiated with the Soviet Union for the SS-21 Scarab, and by late 1983, received its first SS-21. [20] The SS-21 is both more accurate and more difficult to detect than the FROG-7. [21] Wanting longer-range missiles, Syria attempted to acquire the SS-23 from the Soviet Union in 1987. [22] The SS-23's 500km range is considerably better than the SS-21's range. However, Syria's attempts to acquire the missile failed due to the USSR's signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1988, which required the destruction of its ground-launched missiles possessing ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. [23]
New Partners and Improved Capabilities: 1990-2007
The Soviet Union's collapse forced Syria to become
less dependent on its former missile technology supplier. By the early 1990s,
Syria began looking to China, North Korea and Iran for assistance, none of whom
are members of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [24]
According to the CIA, Syria signed an agreement with China as early as 1989 for 30 M-9 launchers and a number of M-9 missiles at a cost of $285 million. [25] The M-9 would have represented a significant upgrade from Syria's Scud B, as its better accuracy makes it suitable for use against military targets. [26] Whether China ever delivered M-9 missiles to Syria remains unconfirmed, and some experts believe U.S. pressure on China successfully halted the deal. [27] Conflicting reports, however, claim China may have circumvented U.S. pressure by providing Syria with the technologies and materials necessary for indigenous production of the missile. [28] Reports that Syria attempted to acquire M-11 missiles from China, which could be deployed on converted Scud B launchers and used to deliver chemical weapons, are similarly unconfirmed. [29]
Many analysts claim that China and North Korea provided training, technology and missile components to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) to develop an indigenous Scud missile production capability, and specifically to construct critical missile-related infrastructure at the underground facilities in Aleppo and Hama. [30] Both locations are believed to host hardened silos for Syria's Scud C missiles, while facilities at Hama are reportedly also home to multiple launchers and an undisclosed chemical warhead facility. [31]
Saudi Arabia and other states rewarded Syria with between two and three billion dollars for its involvement in the 1991 Gulf War coalition that opposed Iraq. [32] Despite U.S. and Israeli diplomatic efforts to prevent it from doing so, Syria used a portion of this money to purchase Scud Cs from North Korea. North Korea shipped three deliveries, totaling 24 Scud Cs, through Iran to the SSRC. [33] In July 1992, Syria tested the Scud C with North Korean assistance, conducting a similar test again in 1997. [34] It is widely believed that North Korea continued to ship Scud Cs to Syria throughout the 1990s, although the total number of missiles involved is unknown. [35]
North Korea is also believed to have assisted Syria with its Scud D program. In 2000, Syria allegedly received Scud D and related technology directly from North Korea. [36] Other reports contend that along with North Korea, China and Iran have been actively assisting Syria to indigenously produce the Scud D. [37] The Scud D is Syria's most advanced missile in terms of range and accuracy, and Israeli officials claim it was successfully tested by Syria in September 2000. [38] It is unknown whether the Scud D is fully operational, but an operational Scud D could improve Syria's strategic outlook vis-a-vis Israel. Not only could it theoretically deliver chemical and biological warheads, but the Scud D could also be deployed deep into Syrian territory, rendering Israeli preemptive strikes more difficult. [39]
Iran has also aided Syria in developing its missile arsenal. The two countries are suspected of having a close military relationship, including joint missile projects dating back to the early 1990s. In 1991, for example, Iran began financing a U.S. $250 million project to jointly produce the Scud C. [40] By 2001, Syria was capable of indigenously producing the Scud C variant. Additionally, Iran facilitated Syria's missile development by serving as an intermediary between North Korea and Syria, permitting the shipment of missile components and technology through Iranian territory. [41]
Recent Developments and Current Status
Although Syria's indigenous capabilities have improved over time, it continues to seek foreign assistance from Chinese, North Korean, Iranian and possibly Russian entities for the purpose of producing solid-propellant rocket motors. Solid-fueled missiles provide multiple advantages over liquid-fueled systems, including greater accuracy, faster mobility, quicker development, and a longer shelf life. [42]
As recently as mid-2008, President Bashar al-Assad visited Russia to negotiate a deal to acquire the solid-propelled Iskander-E ballistic missile. The Iskander-E's capacity to fly at a variable trajectory could aid Syria in evading Israeli air defenses, and it could also be equipped with unconventional warheads. [43] However, the negotiations collapsed under U.S. and Israeli pressure, marking the second round of failed negotiations since 2005. [44]
Syria may also have forged a partnership with Iran to develop a solid-propellant design connected to the Iranian Fateh A-110 program. [45] A 2008 Israeli report claims that Syria is developing its own improved version of the Fateh A-110, although the veracity of this report is uncertain. [46] If true, the Fateh A-110 is a test-proven design possessing a range of 250km, which carries a 500kg warhead or a chemical or sub-munition warhead. [47] U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that Syria is working on developing a solid-propellant production capability, but at least in the open source literature have only speculated that such production is related to the Fateh A-110. [48]
It is also well-known that Syria has multiple anti-ship cruise missile types, including the SS-N-3b (Sepal), and two variants of the Styx, the SS-N-2a and the SS-N-2c. These missile types could be equipped with chemical warheads and are highly accurate. [49] It is unclear what steps Syria is taking to acquire land-attack cruise missiles, which have greater payloads and longer ranges than anti-ship cruise missiles. [50]
In response to Syria's proactive steps to improve its arsenal, the United States and Israel are actively seeking to disrupt Damascus's acquisition of missile technologies. Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) and its Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST) are under U.S. sanctions, and the United States has also sought to restrict Syria's suppliers. [51] In 2005, the U.S. extended the Iran Nonproliferation Act to Syria and North Korea with the intention of preventing these countries from obtaining technology related to weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional weapons. [52] Israel has responded to the perceived Syrian missile threat by improving its Arrow Missile Defense systems, training its troops to respond to missile and rocket attacks, and working diplomatically to prevent Syria from acquiring missile technologies from foreign suppliers, such as Russia. [53] Israeli officials claim Syria has missiles aimed at almost every part of Israel and the disputed Golan Heights. [54]
Israel remains Syria's foremost motivation to acquire more advanced missile systems. [55] However, Syria is also concerned about other potential regional threats, and the U.S./NATO presence in the Middle East. Although Syrian-Turkish relations have improved significantly over the past decade, Turkey remains a close U.S. ally, a member of the NATO alliance, and is on friendly terms with Israel. Syrian missile procurement could also be driven by the decades-long geopolitical rivalry between Iraq and Syria. [56] Although it is unclear whether Syria will pursue long-range ballistic missile systems, Damascus continues to see increasingly advanced ballistic missile systems as vital to its security.
Sources:
[1] "Chemical romance-Syria's unconventional affair develops," Jane's Intelligence Review, 12 February 2009, www.janes.com; Murhaf Jouejati, "The Strategic Culture of Irredentist Small Powers: The Case of Syria," Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 31 October 2006, www.dtra.mil.
[2] Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2002, www.meforum.org.
[3] The total number of missiles in Syria's
possession is unclear since there are some discrepancies among sources, many of
which provide dated estimates. These make a current estimate difficult,
especially in light of improved Syrian capabilities. See, Michael Eisenstadt,
"Policy Watch #1288: Syria's Strategic Weapons Programs," The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 September 2007,
www.washingtoninstitute.org; "Chemical Romance-Syria's
unconventional affair develops," Jane's Intelligence Review,
12 February 2009, www.janes.com; and Anthony Cordesman, "If it's
Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and
International Studies," 15 April 2003, www.csis.org.
[4] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, pp. 38-40, www2.foi.se; For more information on Scud variants see, MissileThreat.com, "Scud B/C/D variants," The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[5] Federation of American Scientists, "Frog-7A," www.fas.org; MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World: Frog-7B," The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[6] Federation
of American Scientists, "SS-21 SCARAB (9K79 Tochka)," www.fas.org;
Andrew Feickert, CRS RL30427, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise
Missiles of Foreign Countries," Congressional Research Service, 5 March
2004, www.fas.org.
[7] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD
Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June
2004, pp. 38-40, www2.foi.se; For more information on Scud variants see,
MissileThreat.com, "Scud B/C/D variants," The Claremont Institute,
www.missilethreat.com; Andrew Feickert, CRS RL30427, "Missile
Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries," Congressional
Research Service, 5 March 2004, www.fas.org.
[8] Andrew Feickert, CRS
RL30427, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign
Countries," Congressional Research Service, 5 March 2004, www.fas.org.
[9] MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World: Scud D Variant,"
The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com; Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 38, www2.foi.se.
[10] Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, pp. 38-40, www2.foi.se; MissileThreat.com,
"Missiles of the World: M-9," The Claremont Institute,
www.missilethreat.com.
[11] David C. Isby, "Israel could face
longer-ranged rocket threat," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1
January 2008, www.janes.com; MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World:
M-11 Variant," The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[12]
"M-11/Fateh A-110/KN-02 variants (Syria), Offensive Weapons,"
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 10 September 2008, www.janes.com.
[13] For more information, see "Syria: Weapons of Mass Destruction in
the Middle East," The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
April 2006, http://cns.miis.edu; Federation of American Scientists,
"SS-N-3 Sepal," www.fas.org.
[14] For more information, see
"Syria: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," The James
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2006, http://cns.miis.edu;
MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World: SS-N-2C," The Claremont
Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[15] Anthony Cordesman, "If
it's Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for
Strategic and International Studies," 15 April 2003, p. 7, www.csis.org.
[16] Missile Defense Agency, "Foreign Ballistic Missile
Capabilities," 10 November 2008, www.mda.mil.
[17] Central
Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions," Covering 1 January to 31 December 2008, www.dni.gov.
[18]
"Syria Missile Development-1997," The Risk Report, Vol. 3,
No. 2, March-April 1997, www.wisconsinproject.org; Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[19] Murhaf Jouejati,
"The Strategic Culture of Irredentist Small Powers: The Case of
Syria," Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems
and Concepts Office, 31 October 2006, www.dtra.mil.
[20] Magnus Normark et
al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish
Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 69, www2.foi.se.
[21] MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World: SS-21 B," The Claremont
Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[22] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria
and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency,
June 2004, p. 69, www2.foi.se.
[23] U.S. Department of State, "
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles," www.state.gov; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD
Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June
2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[24] For more information, see the Missile
Technology Control Regime website, www.mtcr.info.
[25] Magnus Normark et
al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish
Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 70, www2.foi.se.
[26] MissileThreat.com, "Missiles of the World: M-9 Variant," The
Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[27] Joseph Cirincione, Jon
Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "China," in Deadly Arsenals:
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2005), p. 176.
[28] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Syria,"
www.nti.org/db/China/msyrpos.htm.
[29] MissileThreat.com, "Missiles
of the World: M-11 Variant," The Claremont Institute,
www.missilethreat.com.
[30] Ed Blanche, "Syria 'boosts
accuracy' of Scud D," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1
January 2006, www.janes.com.
[31] Khalid Hilal and Leah Kuchinsky,
"Israel Sees Growing Missile Threat From Syria," WMD
Insights, July/August 2007, www.wmdinsights.com; Joseph S. Bermudez,
"DPRK-Pakistan: Ghauri Missile Cooperation," Federation of American
Scientists, 21 May 1998, www.fas.org.
[32] Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[33] Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[34] Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se; Andrew Rathmell,
"Syria's Insecurity," Jane's Intelligence Review,
1 September 1994, www.janes.com.
[35] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and
WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency,
June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[36] "Syria Missile
Milestones-1972-2005," The Risk Report, Vol. 11, No. 5,
September-October 2005, www.wisconsinproject.org; Magnus Normark et al.,
"Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence
Research Agency, June 2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se.
[37] Joseph S. Bermudez,
Jr., "CNS Occasional Papers: #2, A History of Ballistic Missile
Development in the DPRK," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[38] Israeli reports of the 2000 Scud D
test have not been confirmed. Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD
Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June
2004, p. 71, www2.foi.se; Anthony Cordesman, "The Israeli Nuclear Reactor
Strike and Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Background Analysis," 24
October 2007, p. 18, www.csis.org.
[39] Sean Boyne, "Long Road to Progress," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 November 2001, www.janes.com.
[40] Global Security, "Syria: Missile Programs," www.globalsecurity.org.
[41] Arms Control Association, "Fact Sheet:
Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventory," May 2002, www.armscontrol.org.
[42] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and
Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 74,
www2.foi.se.
[43] For more information, see: Defense Update, "Iskander
E (SS-26 Stone)," www.defense-update.com; and www.armscontrol.org.
[44] Ed Blanche, "Russia turns down Syrian missile request,"
Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2008, www.janes.com;
Yaakov Katz, "Russia tells Syria: No missile sales for now,"
Jerusalem Post, 21 November 2008, www.jpost.com.
[45]
"M-11/Fateh A-110/KN-02 variants (Syria), Offensive Weapons,"
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 10 September 2008, www.janes.com;
David C. Isby, "Israel could face longer-ranged rocket threat,"
Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 January 2008, www.janes.com.
[46] David C. Isby, "Israel could face longer-ranged rocket
threat," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 January 2008,
www.janes.com.
[47] David C. Isby, "Israel could face longer-ranged
rocket threat," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 January
2008, www.janes.com.
[48] Duncan Lennox, "Short-range Iranian
ballistic missile on view," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 February
2003, www.janes.com.
[49] Andrew Feickert, CRS RS21252, "Cruise
Missile Proliferation," Congressional Research Service," 28 July
2005, www.fas.org; Dennis Gormley, "The Risks and Challenges of a Cruise
Missile Tipping Point," NTI Issue Brief, September 2008, www.nti.org;
Federation of American Scientists, "Special Weapons Primer: Cruise
Missiles," www.fas.org.
[50] Andrew Feickert, CRS RL30427,
"Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign
Countries," Congressional Research Service, 5 March 2004,
www.fas.org.
[51] "Three Entities Targeted by Treasury for Supporting
Syria's WMD Proliferation," U.S. Department of Treasury, 4 January
2007, www.ustreas.gov.
[52] U.S. Department of State, "Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act: Imposed Sanctions," Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, 24 April 2009, www.state.gov.
[53] Yakkov Katz, "Israel: Russia may be selling Syria arms,"
Jerusalem Post, 21 May 2008, www.jpost.com; Khalid Hilal and Leah
Kuchinsky, "Israel Sees Growing Missile Threat from Syria," WMD
Insights, July/August 2007, www.wmdinsights.com.
[54] Khalid Hilal and
Leah Kuchinsky, "Israel Sees Growing Missile Threat From Syria,"
WMD Insights, July/August 2007, www.wmdinsights.com.
[55] Murhaf
Jouejati, "The Strategic Culture of Irredentist Small Powers: The Case of
Syria," Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems
and Concepts Office, 31 October 2006, www.dtra.mil.
[56] Murhaf Jouejati,
"Syrian WMD Programs in Context," in Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New
Century, ed. James Russell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), pp.
66-73.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
